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A CRITICISM OF THE E.U. DIRECTIVE PROTECTING
COMPUTER SOFTWARE
Robert Shaposka*
I. INTRODUCTION

Computer technology offers a vision of humankind's future a "sneak peek" into the culture of tomorrow. Disheartening, however,
is the chasm separating computer related legislation and the realities
underpinning the computer world's actual practices.
Early legal protection of computers was general and basic.
Often legislatures treated computers as pure goods; an oversimplified
approach incompatible with the unusual international market forces
affecting the fledgling industry. Computers no longer fit within a neat
definition of goods, as Charles Levy writes:
Ifyou look at the computer industry in the world.. .the
hardware is not the money maker for computers (sic)
companies any more. It is the software. It is the
systems integration. Some computer companies joke
that by the beginning of the new century, if you want
a computer, we will give it to you like glasses given
away at gas stations. Because what they want is you
to buy the software, the systems integration, and the
services. And that is where they are going to make
their money. Not in this big box that people are
putting together.1
This counterintuitive development (that software, as opposed to
hardware, drives the computer industry) leaves one wondering how
the law will now protect these "goods," if they are goods at all.
*

Washington & Jefferson College, B.A., 1993; Duquesne University, J.D., 1996;

member of the Pennsylvania Bar.
1 Charles Levy, When Sovereignties May Collide--Sovereignty and the Regulation
of International Business in the Intellectual Property Area: An American
Perspective,20 Can.-U.S. L.J. 185,187(1994).
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Present software protection is centered in the field of
intellectual property. Specifically of interest is the European Union's
Directive of May 14, 19912 that expressly attempts to create
standardized and comprehensive protection for software under the
umbrella of intellectual property.
The success of this directive is unclear, notably since at least
one other directive dealing with semiconductor chips sets out
conflicting standards of protection within the computer industry.
Additionally, some states will prefer sui generis protection (such as
domestic patent law) for a more comprehensive approach in the
computer field. An examination and critique of this EU software
directive, and its likely success, will be the focus of this investigation.
The Directive, and the intellectual property rights it entails, are
of particular interest because enforcement of protected rights can
create justified blocks to the free movement of goods3 , vesting
blocked computer-related goods with essentially the same rights as
computer-related goods of extra-Community origin in the
international marketplace.
II. THE EUROPEAN UNION'S COUNCIL DIRECTIvE ON THE LEGAL
PROTECTION OF COMPUTER PROGRAMS -- GOALS AND
METHODOLOGY.

The Directive is based on powers stemming from Article 100a
of the Maastricht Treaty, calling for harmonization of internal
markets4 , and uses the copyright provisions of the Berne Convention
as a primary means of enforcement. The motivations expressed for
creation of the Directive acknowledge the creative effort put into
computer programs, the fundamental role the computer industry plays
in industrial development in all member states, and the varying degrees
2

Council Directive 91/250, 1991 O.J.(L 122).

3 STEPHEN WEATHERrLL&PAULBEAUMONTECLAW: THE ESSENTIAL
LEGAL WORKINGS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

735 (1993).

GUIDE To THE

4 Treaty Establishing the European Union (Maastricht), March 25, 1957, art. I00a

(as amended through Jan. 1, 1995).
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of protection previously afforded by member states on the topic of
software. The Directive also seeks a clarification of trouble spots in
existing intellectual property protection, such as tests for originality
under copyright, and the need for compatible works among authorized
use of programs. The Directive also expressly indicates it is not to
overpower Maastricht Treaty Articles 85 and 86 dealing with
competition.5 Although these goals directly relate to the Union's
economic aims, one should note that they are carefully defined in
order to not provide one-hundred percent protection to the creator of
software, notably in the areas of interfacing and compatible programs.
It has been critically suggested that this lack of complete
protection in the Directive is intentional due to the fact that eightypercent of all data management software originates outside of the
European Community. Such allowed interfacing would encourage
software firms within the member states to create non-infringing
software based on pre-existing software with the profits from this
new, non-infringing software due only to the European software
houses. 6 This certainly is a remarkable and ethically unstable
economic goal to enhance the computer industry within the Union.
By using copyright, as applied by the Berne Convention, as the major
method of protection in this Directive, the European Union has
created a competitive advantage for its software industry while
maintaining a facade of international reciprocity.
A. Who isprotected under this directive?
Articles 2 and 3 of the Directive indicate who can enforce his
or her rights to protection using the Directive. (This does not mean
other parties under national law cannot use copyright or the Berne
Convention as applied solely within one specific member state.)
5 1991 O.J. (L 122).
6 Louis BERTONE DES BALBES, TnE EEC DiREcTIvE ON COMPUTER SOFTWARE, IN
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW AFTER 1992: A PRACTIcAL GUIDE FOR LAWYERS
OUtrsIDE THE COMMON MARKET 654, 657 (Ralph H. Folsom and Nanda Lake eds.,

1993).
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Article 2, Authorship of Computer Programs, defines the
author of a work as is applied in general copyright law. An author can
hold this right from one of three situations.
First, the author could be the natural person who created the
program, or the person who would normally hold such rights under
national member state law(s). The position of the creator is easily
understood, while another who could hold such rights is vague. Such
a provision is likely a recognition of all rights embodied in the Berne
Convention, which not only entails copyright as understood in the
United States, but also moral rights ofthe creator (rights of attribution
and integrity), that often can be passed on from the author singularly
from pure copyright.7 A similar analysis can be applied to Article 3.
The second method of authorship is joint ownership, where a
group of natural persons contributed to the work, and hold equal
rights of copyright.
The third method of ownership stems from an employeeemployer relationship. Employees creating programs for work
purposes do not hold authorship, which instead rests with the
employer. This can be altered only by express contract. Article 3 of
the Directive, "Beneficiaries of Protection," determines that parties
enforcing benefits under the Directive can be any natural or legal
person who otherwise could enforce a national copyright. This not
only includes legal corporations in the form of employers, but may be
extended to cover natural or legal assignees of any extendable moral
rights.
B. What is covered under the directive?
The Directive states what is to be protected, what acts
constitute violations (and hints at what might be permitted), and
specifically addresses decompilation, with Articles 1, 4, 5, and 6.
7 The United States recently completely complied with the Berne Convention in

embodying similar rights in a legislative subdivision of Federal copyright, the Visual
Artists Rights Act of 1991 (VARA), 17 U.S.C. § 106A 1995).
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1. Article 1: ObJect of Protection.
Article 1, Object of Protection, attempts to define what will be
protected as exclusive. It states that computer programs shall be
protected by copyright as literary works as meant by the Berne
Convention. Before the Directive required this type of protection, the
only EU state that used literary work-copyright protection for
software' was the United Kingdom. This is an odd classification
because most programs are now considered as literary works which
are never readable.9 One wonders if protection as a musical work
would not prove to be a better analogy. One uses a program over and
over without right to sell it just as a consumer uses a musical
recording. Additionally, containment of both in CD-ROM format is
a popular commonality between programs and music. And the
musical analogy has been made when defending licensing violations of
restricted acts, specifically that one need not gain express permission
to play a recording but that one must get permission to run (and by
necessity, make a backup copy) of a licensed program. Objectors to
this analogy claim that programs are more easily copied than are
musical recordings." Though the argument of more easily made
copies is in favor, it seems out of touch with reality, when compact
discs and radio broadcasts are easily recorded on cassettes, even by
children.
A program also includes "preparatory design material." The
Directive does not further define such materials, but the United States
includes supplemental program materials such as descriptions of the
program, its flowcharts, and its instruction manuals. Instructional
videos would probably also be included here. Because of the computer
industry's international nature, the European Union interfaced its
definitions with the Berne Convention's in hopes of reciprocity. 1
8 PETER GROVES, ET. AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE INTERNAL MARKET OF

THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 82 (1993).
9 DES BALBES, supra note 6, at 663-64.
10 GROVES, supranote 8, at 85.

11 DES BALBES, supra note 6, at 658.
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Likely this term will be given a broad and similar reading.
Also consistent with general copyright law is the notion that
only the expression of a program is protected, and not the ideas
underpinning it. This is a commonly litigated concern, and it is not
surprising that the Directive reiterates this idea, since European
software houses would be looking to profit from as many free ideas
as possible. Also, these same manufacturers would argue that many
of a program's key characteristics are its programming ideas and not
expression; this would ease interfacing from a consumer standpoint.
Marketable programs could look the same and familiar. Such a "Look
and Feel" to a consumer is a hotly debatable issue of protection in
computer copyright. Early drafts of the Directive tried to keep the
argument out of the European market because such qualities have
never yet received protection in the member states and the drafting
parties considered the "look and feel" quality protection to be a jumble
of confusion in United States case law." Additionally, early Directive
drafts denied protection to the logic, algorithms, and programming
languages underlying programs. The logic exclusion was removed in
the event that it might be interpreted to protect only literal code, 3 and
it is clear from the Commission's explanatory memorandum
accompanying the Directive that any form of logical expression that
executes a program is protected. This includes both high level/source
code, common computer languages such as Basic or COBOL, and
low level/object code conversions. 4 Algorithms, which are denied
protection in the United States, were removed from exclusions since
no one could settle on a single definition. Programming Languages
were likewise removed from exception to protected materials for the
same reasons as logic.5
These attempted exclusions may be problem areas in future
litigation, since only one topic carries any significant weight of
intended protection, while manufacturers are never sure on which side
12 Id. at661.

Id.
GROVES, supra note 8, at 83.
15 DES BALBES, supranote 6, at 662.
13

14
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of the idea-expression dichotomy logic algorithms fall.
Article 1 also states that a program will merit protection as
original if it is the "author's own intellectual creation."16 No other
criteria are evaluated to determine its protection status. Some
commentators have indicated that this is not a bona-fide statutory
standard and that those seeking a test should look to case law for
one,17 but this clause is surely the test for originality that must be
applied. The phrase defines what factor (not factors) will be
considered, and excludes all other considerations.
2. Article 4: Restricted Acts.
Under Article 4, a copyright owner exclusively controls all
reproductions, including any reproductions for running or storing a
program, any alterations of the program, and public distribution. At
first glance this seems simple, but this provision becomes increasingly
murky when applied to "real life" situations.
Running unauthorized reproductions is authorized because the
user likely purchased the program. This is addressed as an Article 6
exception, regardless of what Article 5's wording implies. This is
often where computer programs are likened to music, where playing
a purchased recording is not a violation.18 The same analysis, both of
necessity to use and as an express exception, applies to any copies,
especially those temporarily made, when running the program.19
Concerns can be voiced concerning what is a distribution to
the public. Some have inquired whether the licensing of programs
includes sales to the public, or whether licensed works have other
protection. The original draft of the Directive employed the term
"marketing" instead of sale,20 suggesting a breadth entailing licensing
as well as sales. The Directive expressly includes a rental as a sale,
16 Council Directive, supra note 2.
17 DEs BALBES, supra note 6, at 663.

18 Id. at 667.

19 Id.at 666-667.
20 Id. at 667.
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but does a rental imply a license? Favoring a broad reading of sales
to cover licenses in the international market of software, the United
States recently amended its Uniform Commercial Code's section 2 of
sales to include section 2A, licenses.21
3. Article 5: Exceptions to Restricted Acts.
Article 5 sets out three exceptions to acts restricted to the
right holder. The first applies to running the program by the lawful
acquirer, and authorizes any copies made necessary to running the
program in its intended format. Necessity is key.
The second exception is the authorization of back-up copies
made by a rightful user. This exception is limited by the vague phrase
"insofar as [copying] is necessary for its use." Who can say when a
back-up copy is necessary, or how many back-up copies are
reasonable? Either this phrase will be a great source of litigation, or
it will be completely ignored by the industry.
The last exception is a very recent development in copyright
law.2' This exception to restrictions allows an authorized user to
"observe, study, or test" any program while using the program in
order to determine any unprotected ideas underlying the program.
The authorized user may then apply the unprotected ideas to other
programs. This does not mean decompilation, as addressed infra,
which uncovers the work put into a program by taking the finished
program apart. Critics regard Article 4 as allowing most any study of
a program which is not decompilation per se.' Article 4 thus allows
software manufacturers to obtain other manufacturer's programs and
encourages the use of underlying ideas among any expression in the
programs.
4. Article 6: Decompilation.
21 See U.C.C. § 2A-102 (1996).
22 DES BALBES, supra note 6, at 668.
23 JONATHAN BAND AND MASANOBU KATOH, INTERFACES ON TRIAL: INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND INTEROPERABILITY IN THE GLOBAL SoFTWARE INDUsTRY

244 (1995).
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Article 6 specifically deals with reverse engineering, the
process of taking a competitor's product and deconstructing it to
discover the methods by which it was developed. It is an easy, cheap,
and often illegal method of gaining technology.
This article of the Directive is called "Decompilation" instead
of reverse engineering because the authors of the Directive could not
understand how one might engineer a literary work.2" (Similarly,
critics of the interoperability provisions lost ground for the very same
reason, that to keep rights to limited parties is an economic goal and
does not relate to the literary nature of protection. These critics
refused to afford secret knowhow, something that is unwritten and
economically driven, any literary protection.25 ) This lofty literary goal
may be inconsistent with the primary goal of a common market: en
masse economic prosperity.
The Directive is unclear whether or not decompilation is
favored. The provision reads like a hybrid of permitted and restricted
acts. The restricted portions may prevent the Directive from
achieving any sort of international harmony. 26 Proponents favoring
decompilation as a means to gain technology purport that everyone in
the industry will benefit if they decompile from each other's products
and continually turn out new, improved versions.27 If this argument
were true, it would not only generate paranoia through the computer
industry, it would probably not appeal to the European consumer,
who prefers a reliable product over the per se newest product. Seen
in this light the provision appears as a thinly veiled attempt of
permitting copying of programs originating from outside of the Union.
The first section of Article 6 informs program users what can
be done to the program without authorization. A user may copy code
and translate the code in the process of properly using the program.
Permitted decompilation must be done, however, by proper licensees.
These licensees must have lacked the previous opportunity to obtain
24 DES BALBES, supra note 6, at 671.
25

Id.

26

Id. at 677.

27

Id. at 675.
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this information and the information gained must be necessary for
interoperability of original programs. Interpretations of permitted
decompilation provisions indicate a requirement that the gained
information is indispensable. It is also believed that one must ask the
author for the information before determining if that information is
readily available and that the goal of interoperability of programs is
important.28
Restricted acts of decompilation are then addressed by the
article. Decompilation is not to be performed in order to gain a
substantially similar product or to sell to third parties.
Almost as an aside, the third provision of Article 6 reiterates
the authors' rights. These rights are not to be interpreted
inconsistently with the Beme Convention, nor do they allow anything
more extensive than a "normal exploitation of the computer
program." 9 The normalcy of an exploitation is not further clarified.
C.How is protectiongranted?
The basic method of protection used by the Directive is
copyright, in its literary sense, and thus is consistent with the Berne
Convention. This is an easy solution for the Union, as most member
states are already parties to Berne, and will need only little national
legislative action to comply. The lack of action on this measure is
reflected in the dearth of Union case law concerning the Directive.
What is not clear is what will happen if the Union joins with new
member states who are not parties to Berne --will they be required to
comply, or will they be able to enforce without reciprocity in exact
provisions?"
Two other methods of protection are addressed by the

Id. at 670-71.
1991 O.J. (L 122) 42 (see specifically Art. 6 § 3).
30 An example that comes to mind are the newly forming Eastern European nations.
Not all former Soviet block nations have accepted Berne, and Berne's applicability to
newly formed and newly independent states is unclear; what will occur if these nations
seek EU acceptance is even murkier.
28

29
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Directive, each meriting an article, but which receive much less focus
than other Directive provisions.
Article 7 provides for "Special Measures of Protection."
These are regarded as restricted acts that do not necessarily constitute
actual copyright infringement under national laws.3 1 A party may not
put a program into circulation knowing or having a reasonable basis
to know that the program is an infringing copy.32 Likewise a party
may not possess for commercial purposes a known infringing program
or having a reasonable belief that such a program infringes. 33 Also
considered a violation is circulation or commercial possession of a
device which removes protective means to prevent unauthorized
copying of a program."' Circulation, however, is not defined under
the article and might mean a sale, license, or free distribution.
Sanctions for these violations is seizure of the program copy by any
method a member state chooses to implement.
Reserved protection may be applied directly through individual
member states in accordance with Article 9, Continued Application of
Other Legal Provisions. This article allows two protections. First, it
allows the same subject matter to gain any protection possible through
member state intellectual property provisions such as patent and
trademark. The article also offers protection to programs created
before the required implementation of the Directive on January 1,
1993, allowing a retroactive application to protected objects. This is
not to say that a retroactive application to claims will necessarily
follow.
D. Issues of Time under the Directive.
Two issues of time can generally arise under this Directive,
term of protection and deadlines of implementation.
Article 8 determines the term of protection consistent with
31

DEs BALBES, supra note 6, at 679.

32

I. at 680.

33

i.

34 Id.
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general copyright as fifty years. If the author is a natural person,
protection is granted for life plus the fifty years. If the author is a
legal person, protection is granted from fifty years after the program's
first introduction to the public. This is determined to be a minimum
term of protection, as the second paragraph of the article allows
inconsistent but greater terms of protection under a member state's
individual laws. This minimum, however, is regarded in the
software/computer industry as greatly exaggerated. Programs
afforded the minimum protection will be either outdated, out of use,
or profitably licensed out for total use by most of the industry well
within fifty years.35
The second issue of time concerns implementation deadlines.
Article 10, Final Provisions, determined that member states must
comply with the Directive by January 1, 1993. Inclusion of such a
deadline opened a Pandora's box of direct effects and Francovich
principle possibilities.36 -Owners of authorship rights may, after
January of 1993, claim rights under direct effects if their member state
governments have not implemented the special measures of "noninfringing" protection as in Article 7 of the Directive. It is conceded
that a citizen may enforce his or her treaty rights individually even if
a directive is not directly applicable, so long as provisions in the
Directive were limited in time.37 Provisions in this Directive giving
latitude already expired on January 1, 1993. In addition, an author
may try to sue a member state government for damages from nonimplementation under the Francovich principle.38 One can easily see

31 Cf Id. at 680.

36 Francovich v. Italy, cases C-6 & 9/90 1991 E.C.R. 1-5357, 2 C.M.L.R. 66 (1993),

stands for the principle that when a directive has a specific time line and is not
implemented by a member state of the EU, a private plaintiff may directly sue that
non-acting member state for damages if the plaintiff can establish first, that the
directive grants rights to individuals, second, that the contents of those rights are
clearly stated in the directive, and third, that there is a causal link between the
.1aintiff's damages and the state failing to act on the directive in question.
P.S.R.F. MATHiJSEN, A GUIDE TO EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 308-09 (5th ed.

1990).
Francovich v. Italy, supranote 36.

38
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economic damages arising out of a lack of Article 7 "special measures
of protection" calling for seizure of infringing products from the
market.
II.ADDITIONAL PROTECTION OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY.
Though attempting to be comprehensive, the EU Directive on
computer software is not the only protection afforded to the computer
industry. The EU has enacted other directives aimed at computer
semiconductor chips ("chips directive"), and the software directive
itself reserves additional protection through the laws of member
states. The Court of Justice may therefore be presented with issues
interpreting the software directive in unintended ways. Such an
interpretation almost occurred in a 1995 copyright claim, and will be
noted here. Lastly, proposals for a directive protecting computer
databases are currently being advocated by the Commission of the
European Union.39
A. The Union's additionalDirectivefocusing on semiconductor
chips.
Five years before the Union promulgated its Directive
protecting software, an earlier Directive was created to protect
another aspect of the computer industry --semiconductor chips. The
preamble of the chips directive reads similar to the software
directive's."4 The chips directive may therefore have been created by
as much a desire to protect a specialized industry, as an experiment to
test case specific directives, and determine how to use directives to
favor Union markets without provoking significant external criticism.
The chips directive is regarded as a response to the United
States' Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984 ("Chip Protection
Debra B. Rosier, The European Union's ProposedDirective for the Legal
ProtectionofDatabases:A New Threat to the FreeFlow of Inforlation, 10(1) HIGH
TECH.L.J. 105, 107 (1995).
40 Compare directive 1991 O.J. (L 122) with directive 87/54 EEC.
39
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Act"). 41 The Chip Protection Act opened discussion in the computer
industry on whether semiconductor chips, not being pure intellectual
property, merited protection under the Berne Convention. Hoping for
comity, the Union followed the case of the United States, by enacting
specific legislative protection.42 The desire for reciprocity in an
international market is clear from the specific provisions and
contingencies contained in Article 3, sections (6) and (7), dealing with
agreements with non-Member States.
The chips directive vests the creator of a chip with the power
to enforce a negative right against others using the product, similar to
intellectual property. The protected objects are defined in Article 1 as
being the three-dimensional patterns, or topography, of the
semiconductor chips themselves. This is not referred to by its
common industry name, a "mask", because the authors wanted to
allow future interpretations of semiconductor chips to be covered
without creation of a new directive.43 Much of the methodology of
protection is deferred to individual member states as shown in Articles
2 and 4 of the semiconductor directive.
Article 4 allows permissive registration and deposit of the chip
in a manner similar to the United States' patent process. Article 5
determines the prohibited acts to be chip reproduction and commercial
exploitation, and the third paragraph of this Article allows an in-depth
analysis of the chip by others without authorization. This has been
interpreted as fully allowing reverse-engineering/decompilation of
semiconductor chips in the Union's member states.44 The term of
protection for chips is set at 10 years from the date of registration or
15 years from first fixation if not registered pursuant to Article 7.
Critics of the United States semiconductor protection maintain
that the authors ignored that semiconductor chips may have been
41

Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-914 (1994),

amended by the Semiconductor International Protection Extension Act of 1991, §1,
105 Stat. 320 (1991).
GROVES, supranote 8, at 13 1.
41 See id. at 133.
42

44 Id. at 135.
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protected under the Paris Convention on Industrial Property.45 The
Paris Convention provides general protection for "goods" of
intellectual property while the Berne Convention protects more
literary and artistic works. But the Paris Convention was never really
integrated into successful semiconductor chip protection. This
existing criticism and failure to properly function may have been the
reason the authors of the European Union's computer software
directive decided to integrate software protection with the Berne
Convention.
In any event, the chip directive is an interesting foreshadowing
of computer protection under the Union considering the Union's
motivations, definition of what goods and acts should be protected,
lenient attitudes toward reverse engineering, and delegation to
member states the means of protection. The only practical difference
between the two Directives is a reliance on pre-existing international
Conventions by the latter software directive.

B. Case law touchingon the software directive as copyright.
It is important to note that to date no issues concerning the
software directive have been referred to the Union's Court of Justice.
In other copyright claims, the Court has been careful to distinguish
general copyright issues from the copyright protection afforded to
software in the 1991 directive.
Such a mention is noted in a 1995 holding by the Court in
Radio Telefis Eireannand another v. European Commission.46 The
issues of that case concerned competition under Article 86 of the
Treaty and compulsory licensing of copyrights. The plaintiffs in the
case were publishers who wished to print complete weekly television
guides in Northern Ireland. Individual television guides were
published by each of the major broadcasting networks on an individual
"s Id. at 132.
46

Joined cases 241 & 242/9 1, Radio Telefis Eirmann and another v. Commission,

1995 E.C.R. 416.
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basis, and each refused to offer up the information to the publisher
relying on exclusivity of copyright as expressed in the Berne
Convention. 7 The plaintiff-publisher consistently won in decisions
by the Commission on Article 86 of the Treaty, the Court of First
Instance of the European Communities, and on defendant's appeal to
the Court of Justice. 8
The defendants in the case were in a de facto dominant
position as per Article 86. Claims of exclusivity through copyright
created abusive dominance but it prevented the production of a new,
comprehensive product. Though the dominant position did not affect
inter-member state trade, it had the potential to do so. The
Commission had the valid power to stop infringements of Article 86
as determined by Regulation 17/62, article 349 On its face the Radio
Telefis decision has little to do with software, but the Commission
was fearful of the case's influence on software, and the parties of the
case noted an intent to exclude computer software from the decision.5"
Software manufacturers are in a similar position to the
broadcasters in Radio Telefis, holders of exclusive information
questionably protected by copyright. The holding indicates that the
Commission had concerns during argument of the case that the
decision would impact upon software manufacturers if copyright were
allowed as a viable defense against unfair competition.5 The
defendant's response was that express legislation should be created to
the contrary.5" Legislative action became unnecessary on account of
the decision extinguishing such a defense, but the Court was very
careful to say that under the case's fact situation, the Berne
Convention did not apply copyright to the Community.53 Inconsistent

47 Id. at 9 3-10 (opinion of the Advocate General).
48

Id. at 9.

41

Id. at 8.
136.

50 Id. at
51 Id.
52

Id.

53 Id. at

83 (judgement of the Court).
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with the concerns of the Commission, this distinguishes the copyright
situation addressed to the Union's Court of Justice from any situations
which might arise under the software directive. The software
directive directly applies standards of the Berne Convention to the
Community as a whole, even as the Community is not a per se
signatory to the Berne Convention. Though the Union, especially the
Commission, feared use of such a defense with the software directive,
the holding from the Court of Justice does not create any sort of
express deterrence to use of such a copyright defense in the field of
computer software.
C. The ProposedDatabaseProtection.
The effects of the proposed database directive" are similar to
those of the software directive -- European markets are favored while
foreign, notably American, databases are more open to abuse.
Though in a much more limited manner, the database directive takes
from the software directive an interfacing of protection with the Berne
Convention in the form of copyright guarantees.
The Commission proposed this directive since it recognized
the need to balance the necessity of accessing the myriad of
information stored in worldwide databases, especially medical and
educational information, against the ease with which these databases
can be downloaded and copied.55 The needs for such additional
protection beyond existing copyright laws remains questionable. Most
information is denied protection under copyright since such
information is simply facts lacking in originality. The proposed
database directive seeks to encourage individuals to profit from
collecting these facts. In addition, few issues have been presented to

54 Amended Proposal for a Council Directive on the Legal Protection of Databases,

EUR. PA.RL. Doc. (COM 464 final-SYN 393) (1993). Please note that an original
copy of the proposed Directive is generally unavailable, therefore all direct references
to the Directive throughout this article are based on factual statements indebted and
cited to the Rosier.
55 Rosier, supra note 39, at 106.
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the Union concerning abuse of databases. To date, only one written
question has been presented to the Commission concerning exchanges
of personal data for insurance purposes."' One issue hardly seems to
objectively justify the Commission's proposed Directive on the matter.
Database compilations is the subject matter protected by the
proposed database directive. The database directive vests the rights to
use these databases with the owner of the data who, unlike in the field
of copyright, is not necessarily the "author." Also noted is that moral
rights will probably not be gained by the owner." The database
protection focuses only on the economic benefits to be derived from
database exclusivity, and not inherent valuation of the information
itself.
The protection of the databases is enacted in a bifurcated
manner. The first approach is a weakened recognition of the Berne
Convention and existing copyright protection. The Directive applies
such protection to all databases originating in the Union and as well
as foreign databases on conditions of reciprocity.58 Copyright is weak
as a protective measure because it does not apply to facts, which are
the main substance of a database.
The second approach is pure sui generis protection from the
Directive preventing the unauthorized extraction of information.59
This second approach to protection has the practical effect of
removing any ability of international reciprocity of the proposed
database directive, as no other nation grants protection of databases
in this form.'
The Directive also expressly states which acts relating to
databases will be exceptions in terms of additions and uses. Limited
additions will be permitted to databases on three conditions: (1) the
addition must be brief and the author must be noted; (2) the addition
may be a quotation; or (3) the addition may be a pertinent
56

1994 O.J. (C 336) 31.

57 Rosier, supra note 39, at 113, 116-17.

5' Id. at 114-16.
59 Id. at 116.
60 Id. at 122-23.
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illustration."'
In general under usage, one may remove insubstantial parts
from the database. 2 No definition of "insubstantial parts" has been
presented, and case law is a problematic method for refining this test
for the same reason case law does not assist in defining the software
Directive's standard of originality -- there is no precedent value. One
may also use the database for private or non-commercial uses, to
which copyright's fair use defense may be applied."3 Two concerns
occur by these permitted uses. It remains unclear whether the
permitted private/non-commercial uses are limited to removing
insubstantial parts or whether, since it may be assumed that profit
should not occur, the entire database will be open to private users.
There is also discussion as to whether licensing of the databases will
open the door to abuse of those databases by either commercial or
non-profit users in permitting a fair use copyright defense."
The term of protection is split depending upon which of the
two protections, Berne or the sui generis approach, is being enforced.
The copyright provisions of 50 years are consistent with Berne. The
sui generisaspects will be protected for at least 10 years, and may be
extended up to 15 years in the final draft of the Directive.6 Such a
shortened term of protection is consistent with computer industry
standards, where goods and services such as software and databases
are outdated very quickly and no longer require protection. The term
of protection begins "at successive accumulation of insubstantial
additions, deletions, or alterations in respect to the contents of the
database."' This is interesting because one wonders if this clause will
be used to define permitted removal of "insubstantial parts." The
passage suggests that the information going into a database is
"insubstantial" before being accumulated, and would thus likely to be
6 Id.at 119.
Id. at 119.
63 Id. at 120-21.
64 i. at 121-22.
65

Id. at 117.

66

It.at 118.
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still "insubstantial" when removed. Such an interpretation could
permit large segments of a database to be removed from the whole,
especially if facts show that the original additions to the database were
large deposits of information, "insubstantial" before accumulation.
The database directive has three major criticisms which
indicate it will not be an effective means of database protection.
The first criticism relates to the standard of what will be
protected. By interfacing with the Berne Convention for at least onehalf of the protection, the database will have to meet Berne standards
of originality over facts in order to gain copyright protection. In the
alternative a lesser standard, analogous to what exists in Great Britain,
has been suggested. This lesser standard could protect databases if
the collection of information manifests application of a special skill.67
After all, what database protection should protect is that the collection
of the database's comprehensive information is special enough to merit
protection.
The second criticism is that database protection creates an
express block to the free flow of information within the Union. The
World Intellectual Property Organization suggests that the Berne
Convention should not be used in such a restrictive manner, and if the
Directive is successful, Berne should be amended to correct this
abuse.68 It is unsure how strong this position will become since the
software directive, and intellectual property rights, are generally
recognized as acceptable blocks to free movements of goods achieved
through equivalent means.
The third criticism flags, before the database directive is
accepted, one problem the Directive shares with the existing software
directive. This criticism points out that the database directive has
been drafted in a manner which hinders possibilities of reciprocity
under the Berne Convention.69 Such a criticism manifests the
underlying aim to favor European databases and open foreign
67
68
69

Id. at 134.
Id. at 136.
Id. at 137.
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databases to potential abuse in the Union's commercial market. It
would be practically impossible for foreign owners of databases to
enforce these rights without reciprocity.
The database directive results in the same effects as the
software directive, using the Berne Convention as a means of
protection while limiting reciprocity in order to favor the European
market. It will be interesting to observe the final draft of the database
directive in light of these criticisms as the effects are currently in
practice with the software directive.
IV. CONCLUSIONS

Copyright protection should, if applied as generally used,
create blocks to the free movement of computer software in sales and
distribution. Infringing copies should not arrive on the market for a
consumer to purchase. This is certainly what the software directive
appears to accomplish. But the Directive, perhaps intentionally, goes
beyond its goals.
One can see that it is not comprehensive as a means of general
protection; it refuses to stand alone. It expressly permits additional
member states protections in the realm of intellectual property. It is
a sibling to another earlier Directive on semiconductor chip
technology. The software directive also seems to have borne a
proposed directive on database protection, operating in a similar
manner with similar goals. And most importantly, the Directive draws
on concepts, terminology, and member state legislation as used under
the Berne Convention.
The Directive is also not comprehensive as a means of specific
copyright protection. It can accommodate an abuse of free ideas from
allegedly protected programs and spells out the means by which an
inflinging party may obtain this information. It allows for "necessary"
decompilation.
Unlike general copyright protection of programs, especially as
regarded in the United States which is a major manufacturing nation
of software, the Union's protective measures are not a step in the right
direction. The Union does not afford protection when a creating

540

BUFFALOJOURNAL OFINTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol.3

author may wish to preserve his or her rights in the future. The
Directive, in the guise of progressive copyright protection, is in fact
a means of progression only to enhance the economic strength of the
European software industry by allowing for slight violations of other
authors' programs in the Union. The Directive protects and
encourages development from existing programs which is a malum in
se moral violation among computer industry standards. The Directive
does not manifest this principled standard.

